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Abstract 
 
While not being widespread, stress tests of credit risk are not new in the Argentine financial system, 
neither for financial intermediaries nor for the Central Bank. However, they are more often based on 
rule-of-thumb approaches than on systematic, model based methodologies. The objective of this 
paper is to fill this gap. With a database that covers the 1994-2006 period we implement a three 
staged approach. First, we use bank balance sheet data to estimate a dynamic panel data model, with 
different statistical methodologies, to explain bank losses for credit risk with bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables. In a second step, the macroeconomic drivers of bank losses, real GDP  
growth and cost of short term credit, are modeled with a Vector Autoregression (VAR). The VAR 
shows the effect of the variables (i.e. risk factors) that we find dominate the domestic business cycle: 
the price of commodities, the sovereign risk and the federal funds rate. Finally, we use this toolkit to 
perform deterministic and stochastic scenario analysis. In the first case we use the behavior of the risk 
factors during the crisis of 1995 (Tequila contagion) and 2001 (Currency Board collapse), and we 
implement a subjective scenario as well. The stochastic scenarios are performed by Monte Carlo with 
two alternative methodologies: a non-parametric bootstrapping approach and drawing repeatedly from 
a multivariate normal distribution. When comparing the estimated unexpected losses to available 
capital, we find that currently the Argentine financial system is adequately capitalized to absorb the 
higher losses that would take place in a stress situation.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Stress tests of credit risk are increasingly being used as a complement to more 
standardized and widespread credit risk management tools, such as credit scoring 
models, segmentation algorithms, rating systems and portfolio credit risk models. 
While the performance of these methodologies can be fairly stable and reliable under 
normal business conditions, stress testing methodologies are more appropriate to 
measure potential credit losses during extreme but plausible adverse events2. 
 
The survey conducted by the Committee on the Global Financial System back in 
2004 (CGFS (2005)), in which major banks and securities firms participated, 
indicated that although most of them performed stress tests for credit risk, these tests 
were outnumbered by those for market risk: more than 80% of the stress tests 
reported in the survey were based on trading portfolios, with those based on 
movements in interest rates being the dominant type. However, the survey also 
indicated that In comparison with the previous survey3, there was a greater focus on 
credit and less attention to equity markets.  
 
While not being widespread, stress tests of credit risk are not new in the Argentine 
financial system, neither for financial intermediaries nor for the Central Bank or 
Argentina (BCRA). During 2006, the Superintendence of Exchange and Financial 
Institutions conducted a survey (SEFyC (2006)) on stress test practices among local 
banks. The answers also show the preeminence of market risk over credit risk stress 
tests: of the 39 institutions in the sample4 30 perform stress tests for interest rate risk 
and 28 for currency risk, while only 15 stress test credit risk.  
 
Both at financial institutions and at the BCRA stress tests for credit risk are more 
often based on rule-of-thumb approaches than on systematic, model based 
methodologies. For example, a usual approach is to simulate a general downgrade of 
bank borrowers creditworthiness, reflected in their risk classification. Since 
borrowers risk classification determines their provision rate, an across the board 
migration to lower rating grades implies larger provisions and a stressed income 
statement. The resulting losses are compared to the available capital. This is for 
example the approach that the IMF and the World Bank used in the FSAP for 
Argentina performed in the year 2001. 
 
Part of the interest in this methodology can also be ascribed to the explicit 
requirement that banks adopting Basel II complement their Pillar I calculations with 
those resulting from stress tests5 (BCBS (2006)). In addition, it is a relatively 
unexplored field of research. 
                                               
2
 MAS (2003) advises risk managers to adopt a two-pronged approach to risk management, where 
on the one hand they use various qualitative techniques to measure risk in ordinary business 
conditions, while on the other, they use stress-tests to quantify likely losses under stress conditions.  
3
 See CGFS (2001). 
4
 Out of 90 institutions contacted, 35 did not perform stress tests and 16 did not answer the survey. 
5
 Pillar 1, Part 4, Section V, Stress tests used in assessment of capital adequacy, states: the 
bank must perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific conditions on its IRB 
regulatory capital requirements () For this purpose, the objective is not to require banks to consider 
worst-case scenarios. The banks stress test in this context should, however, consider at least the 
effect of mild recession scenarios. In this case, one example might be to use two consecutive quarters 
of zero growth to assess the effect on the banks PDs, LGDs and EADs. In Part 2 of Pillar 2, 
 3
As from 2006, the Central Bank of Argentina is using a non-parametric loan portfolio 
credit risk model to assess losses in stress scenarios (see Gutierrez Girault (2007)), 
particularly to the left of the 99.9th percentile of the loss distribution. However, the 
methodology does not explicitly model the link between the macroeconomic 
environment and bank losses. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap developing 
a full fledged methodology to perform stress tests for credit risk, modeling the 
sources of macroeconomic downturns and the effect on the banking sector.  
 
With a database that covers the 1994-2006 period we implement a three-staged 
approach. First, we use bank balance sheet data to estimate a dynamic panel data 
model, with different statistical methodologies, to explain bank losses for credit risk 
with bank-specific and macroeconomic variables. In a second step, the 
macroeconomic drivers of bank losses, real GDP growth and cost of short term credit 
are modeled with a Vector Autoregression (VAR). The VAR shows the effect of the 
variables (i.e. risk factors) that we find dominate the domestic business cycle: the 
price of commodities, the sovereign risk and the federal funds rate. Finally, we use 
this toolkit to perform deterministic and stochastic scenario analysis. In the first case 
we use the behavior of the risk factors during the crisis of 1995 (Tequila contagion) 
and 2001 (Currency Board collapse), and we implement a subjective scenario as 
well. The stochastic scenarios are performed by Monte Carlo with two alternative 
methodologies: a non-parametric bootstrapping approach and drawing repeatedly 
from a multivariate normal distribution. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II describes the data used, while section III estimates the models. Section IV 
performs the scenario analysis, comparing the estimated unexpected losses to the 
available capital. Section V contains the conclusions. 
 
 
II. Data 
 
To construct the stress test framework we use a database with annual data that 
covers the thirteen year period comprised between 1994 and 2006. The reason for 
choosing it is the availability of bank balance sheet data: the information previous to 
November 1994 is not incorporated to the BCRAs digital information systems (being 
stored in paper format). Besides, it encompasses years of high and moderate growth, 
as well as economic downturns and a sharp recession. Since during this period new 
banks initiated their operations, while others merged or closed, we have an 
unbalanced panel which contains information for at most 13 years for a number of 
banks that range from 202 in 1994 to 90 in 2006. Table 1 characterizes the banking 
system throughout this period. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Specific issues to be addressed under the supervisory review process, states in section B, 
Credit Risk: 1. Stress tests under the IRB approaches. A bank should ensure that it has sufficient 
capital to meet the Pillar 1 requirements and the results (where a deficiency has been indicated) of the 
credit risk stress test performed as part of the Pillar 1 IRB minimum requirements The results of the 
stress test will thus contribute directly to the expectation that a bank will operate above the Pillar 1 
minimum regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors will consider whether a bank has sufficient capital for 
these purposes. To the extent that there is a shortfall, the supervisor will react appropriately. This will 
usually involve requiring the bank to reduce its risks and/or to hold additional capital/provisions, so that 
existing capital resources could cover the Pillar 1 requirements plus the result of a recalculated stress 
test. 
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Table I. Summary macroeconomic and banking statistics (1994  2006) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GDP growth (%) 6 -3 6 8 4 -3 -1 -4 -11 9 9 9 9 
Inflation (%) 3 3 0 -1 -2 -2 1 -1 31 11 9 9 13 
Exchange Rate 
(AR$/US$) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.1 
Bank assets (%)* 33 36 40 45 48 54 57 46 60 50 48 42 40 
Private sector 
loans (%)* 18 18 18 20 21 22 20 17 9 6 8 10 11 
Loan Loss 
Provisions (%) 13 11 9 8 8 8 10 12 29 27 18 9 5 
Banks 202 155 146 134 126 116 111 105 99 94 91 89 90 
* Expressed as fraction of GDP. Loan loss provisions expressed as fraction of loans to the non-financial private sector. 
 
In  our estimations the bank loss rate for credit risk is proxied by the ratio of loan loss 
provisions (LLPs) to loans to the private sector6. According to the provisioning 
regulation set forth by the BCRA, provisions for credit risk depend on the risk rating 
of the bank borrowers. Following detailed guidelines set by the BCRA, risk ratings 
are assigned to the borrowers by each of their corresponding creditors7 and range 
between 1 and 5 depending on the perceived risk. In the case of retail borrowers, the 
risk classification depends on their payment behavior, in particular of the days past 
due, with borrowers less than 90 days past due being classified 1 or 2. For 
commercial borrowers the relationship between days in arrears and the risk 
classification is less direct; there are criteria in addition to payment behavior to 
decide how the firm will be classified, such as the projected cash-flow, business 
sector, etc.  
 
The first downturn included in the sample took place during 1995, when the 
Argentine economy suffered the consequences of the end-of-1994 Mexican 
devaluation. As a result of the contagion (the so-called Tequila effect) real GDP fell 
by 2.8% in 1995; nevertheless, the recession was short-lived and in 1996 the 
Argentine economy was growing fast again.  
 
The 2002 crisis was far more complex. Its origin can be traced back to the second 
half of 1997, when emerging markets were hit hard in the aftermath of the crisis in 
South East Asia. Confidence regarding emerging market resilience faltered further 
during the Russian crisis in the second half of 1998, and after Brazils currency crisis 
and abandonment of its crawling peg in January 1999. In addition to this international 
adverse juncture, throughout all this period Argentina showed a weak fiscal position, 
therefore being particularly vulnerable to the changing mood in international financial 
markets and displaying a negative debt dynamic. The 19982001 period also 
showed a hostile international environment in the real sector, with weak commodity 
prices and an overvalued domestic currency.  
                                               
6
 In the computation of this ratio we include on-balance loans and provisions only. Therefore, loans 
completely written-off and removed to off-balance accounts have not been included in the computation 
of the LLPs ratio.  
7
 This implies that individuals with operations with many banks receive one risk classification from 
each creditor. 
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The perception that the Currency Board and the servicing of the public debt were 
unsustainable, and that the government lacked the necessary political strength to 
push forward the required reforms gained momentum in the third quarter of 2001, 
when the bank run which had been incipient as from the beginning of that year 
became massive. At the end of November the financial system collapsed and the 
conversion of banks deposits was suspended: on November 30 the government 
declared a deposit freeze. By February 2002 the government had abandoned the 
Currency Board, defaulted on the public debt and converted to local currency most of 
the obligations set in US dollars, including bank deposits in that currency8. That year, 
real GDP fell by 11%. 
 
The behavior of the Argentine economy in the estimation window, summarized by  
GDP growth, consumer price index (CPI) inflation and the exchange rate, is depicted 
in Graph 1.  
 
Graph 1. Growth, inflation and exchange rate (1994  2006) 
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Graph 2 shows GDP growth and the bank loss rate for credit risk in the estimation 
window. It is evident how the financial turmoil that began in 1997 impacted the local 
business cycle, after which the Argentine economy slipped into the recession that 
concluded in the 2002 crisis. It also shows the clear inverse and strong relationship 
between GDP growth and the ratio of LLPs to loans to the private sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 Bank deposits in US$ were converted to pesos at an exchange rate (AR$/US$) lower than the one 
prevailing in the foreign exchange market. The difference was covered with CPI-indexed public debt. 
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Graph 2. LLPs and GDP Growth (1994  2006) 
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III. Methodology9 
 
This section describes the methodology developed to perform macro stress testing of 
credit risk. In the first part we present the micro or credit risk satellite model, which 
links the macroeconomic variables to bank losses. Secondly we present the 
macroeconomic model, used to link external shocks to the macroeconomic variables 
that are relevant to explain bank losses for credit risk.  
 
III.a. The Microeconomic or Credit Risk Satellite Model 
 
To construct our measure of loss for credit risk we use the ratio of LLPs to loans to 
the private sector, subject to a logit transformation10. The simplest approach to 
estimate our panel data model would be with the static fixed-effects estimator, the 
latter being a reasonable assumption since we are working with all the financial 
institutions in the financial system. The equation to be estimated would be, 
 
ittitiit å+ùZ+âX+á=y              (1) 
 
where yit is the dependent variable (loss rate) for bank i in period t, ái represents firm 
specific and time invariant (fixed) effects (unobserved heterogeneity), Xit contains 
bank-specific time varying variables (observed heterogeneity) and a constant, Zt has 
time varying macro variables, common to all the banks and åit is the bank-specific 
disturbance in period t. There is a single covariate included in X, which is the lagged 
first difference in bank loan growth, which measures to what extent the bank has 
been speeding up (or slowing down) its lending activity. Time varying macro 
                                               
9
 Models in this section were estimated with Stata. 
10
 Defined as logit (x) = log [x/(1-x)]. 
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variables, contained in Z, include current GDP growth, the lagged overdraft interest 
rate (in AR$) and an interaction effect between the lagged GDP growth and lagged 
interest rate.  
 
However, a visual inspection of the time pattern of the pooled loss rate (Graph 2) 
suggests that the dependent variable would be better modeled with a dynamic 
specification. This can be accomplished introducing the lagged dependent variable 
as a regressor in the static fixed-effects model. This dynamic fixed-effect or least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator poses the following model,  
 
ittiti1-itit å+ùZ+âX+áñy=y              (2) 
 
which is estimated by applying OLS to the model expressed in deviations from time 
means. The estimated coefficients are shown in Table 2. However, it is well known 
that this approach renders biased estimates: the LSDV estimator is inconsistent for 
finite T and N11 (Nickell (1981)), which is in fact the case of our sample panel. 
The reason for this bias is the correlation between the transformed lagged dependent 
variable and the transformed current disturbance. In an attempt to cope with this 
bias, Kiviet (1995) tries to correct the LSDV estimates by subtracting from them an 
approximation of their small sample bias. However, this approach does not handle 
unbalanced panels. Bruno (2004) develops a two-step procedure for correcting the 
LSDV bias in unbalanced panels, which in the first step uses consistent estimates of 
the equation coefficients. The estimated coefficients computed with the estimator 
presented in Bruno (2004), LSDVC, are also shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Micro model: LSDV and LSDV-corrected dynamic specifications  
 LSDV Bruno (AH) Bruno (AB) Bruno (BB) 
Loss Rate (Lag)  0.50 ***   0.73 *** 0.67 *** 0.73 *** 
GDP Growth  -5.97 ***  -6.74 *** -6.24 *** -6.46 *** 
AR$ i (Lag)  1.59 ***          0.68 ** 0.88 *** 0.71 *** 
 Loan Growth (Lag)   0.02 ***          0.02         0.02 *        0.02 
GDP x AR$ i (Lag) -3.36 **         -2.86 **        -3.01 **      -2.73 *** 
cons12 -1.45 ** - - - 
Within R2 0.57    
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels.  Significance  
tests were computed with bootstrapped standard errors. First step estimates were obtained from the 
Anderson  Hsiao, Arellano  Bond and Blundell  Bond consistent estimators respectively. 
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose an instrumental-variable estimator (AH) which is 
consistent for T fixed and N, and therefore is also suitable given the 
characteristics of our sample. This estimator is based on a differenced form of the 
original dynamic equation, 
 
1-itit1-tt1-itit2-it1-it1-itit -+Z-Z+âX-âX+y-y=y-y ååùùññ          (3) 
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 Behr (2003) shows that the asymptotic bias of the LSDV estimated coefficients is increasing in , in 
the number of individuals in the sample (N) and in the sum of squared residuals, and decreasing in T. 
Judson and Owen (1996) show that the bias of the  estimate is more severe than that of . 
12
 By default, the xtlsdvc command in Stata estimates the model with no constant. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) 1-itit1-tt1-itit2-it1-it1-itit -+Z-Z+X-Xâ+y-y=y-y ååùñ          (4) 
 
which cancels out the fixed effects, that may be correlated with the exogenous 
variables. Since the difference of the lagged endogenous variable is correlated with 
the difference in the error term, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest instrumenting 
(yit-1  yit-2) with yit-2 or (yit-2  yit-3), which are expected to be uncorrelated with the 
differenced error term. The estimated coefficients of the AH estimator13 are included 
in Table 3.  
 
Although N-consistent, the AH estimator is not efficient since it does not use all the 
available moment conditions. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (AB), which also first-differences the SE model 
but obtains additional instruments from orthogonality conditions between the lagged 
values of yit and (it-it-1). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when  is 
moderately large and T is moderately small, the AB estimates have large finite 
sample bias and poor precision. Therefore, we also compute the System GMM 
estimator, developed in Blundell and Bond (1998), who exploit further moment 
conditions. The System GMM estimator is however not free from problems; for 
example Hayakawa (2005) shows that when the variances of the individual effects 
and of the disturbances are unequal the bias of this estimator is fairly large. The 
estimates obtained from both GMM based approaches, AB and BB, are also included 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Micro model: IV and GMM based dynamic specifications 
 AH AB BB 
Loss Rate (Lag) 0.89 ***         0.61 *** 0.85 *** 
GDP Growth        -7.85 ***        -6.40 *** -6.82 *** 
AR$ i (Lag)         0.12               0.98 ***        -0.42 ** 
 Loan Growth (Lag)         0.05 ***          0.04 *** 0.00 *** 
GDP x AR$ i (Lag) -3.86 ***        -3.56 **        -4.42 *** 
                           Note: ***, ** and *  indicate statistical significance at 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels. 
 
In spite of the differences in the statistical methodologies used, in general all 
estimated coefficients have the expected signs. The high coefficient of the 
autoregressive component reflects the persistence of the loss rate and supports our 
initial guess based on the observation of Graph 2. The estimated effects of the 
macroeconomic variables are also intuitive: higher GDP growth lowers bank losses 
since it improves the credit quality of bank borrowers, while the converse happens 
with higher interest rates. The estimate for bank credit granting stance14 indicates 
that those banks that were lending aggressively are likely to experience larger 
losses.  
 
Given the abovementioned advantages and disadvantages of the diverse dynamic 
panel data estimators, the features of our sample panel (unbalanced with large N and 
short T) and the fact that the autoregressive component seems to be large, the 
scenario analysis of section IV will be performed with the estimators developed in 
                                               
13
 We instrument (yit-1  yit-2) with yit-2. 
14
  Loan Growth. 
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Bruno (2004) and Blundell and Bond (1998). However, since the latter yields a 
negative estimated coefficient for the lagged interest rate, implying that higher 
interest rates yield lower losses for credit risk, the conclusions drawn from this 
estimator must be interpreted with prudence.  
 
III.b. The Macroeconomic Model 
 
The approach used to modeling the macroeconomic variables that explain the 
behavior of bank losses is non-structural. With a vector autoregression (VAR), we 
estimate the following system:  
 
ttp-tp2-t21-t1t å+BX+YA+YA+YA=Y               (5) 
 
where Yt is a k vector of endogenous variables, Xt a vector of exogenous variables, 
A1, A2  Ap and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and åt is a vector of 
innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with 
their own lagged values and the right-hand side variables.  
 
The endogenous variables included in vector Y are real GDP growth and AR$ 
interest rate for overdrafts, while the strictly exogenous variables in Xt are sovereign 
risk, the federal funds rate15 and the price of commodities. Sovereign risk is 
measured by the EMBI index for Argentina for the years between 1994 and 2002; as 
from 2003 it is measured by the spread of the BODEN 2012 US$ bond over US 
Treasury bonds of similar modified duration. The fed funds rate has nearly perfect 
correlation with the yield of US Treasury bonds, in particular with short-maturity ones, 
and in practice it sets the floor to the cost at which an emerging economy 
government can obtain financing in the international capital market. Finally, the price 
of commodities is measured by an index expressed in US dollars and published by 
the BCRA.  
 
The usual lag-order selection statistics (Final Prediction Error, Akaikes Information 
Criterion, Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and 
Quinn information criterion (HQIC)) as well as other preliminary exploratory analysis 
suggest a one period lag structure be used. Therefore in equation (5) p equals 1 and 
the VAR estimated is, 
 
tt1-t1t å+BX+YA=Y               (6) 
 
According to the Lagrange-Multiplier Test there is neither first nor second order 
autocorrelation in the residuals. All the eigenvalues associated to the stability test lie 
inside the unit circle; therefore, the estimated VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
The estimated coefficients for equation (6) are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15
 The interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other 
depository institutions overnight. 
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Table 4. Macro model: Vector Autoregression 
 GDP Growth AR$ i 
GDP Growth (Lag) -0.02942 -0.24405 
AR$ i (t-1) -0.00586  0.42177 ** 
Sovereign Risk -0.00003 ***  0.00007 *** 
Commodity Price  0.00209 *** -0.00120 
Federal Funds Rate -1.41787 **  2.75817 *** 
cons -0.05282  0.09038 
R-square  0.88  0.93 
         Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 99%, 99.5% and 99.9%  
        confidence levels.  
 
Simple as it is, this reduced form VAR renders estimated coefficients with the 
expected signs: lagged domestic interest rates impact negatively on the GDP growth 
rate, the sovereign risk impacts positively on domestic interest rates and negatively 
on economic growth, an increase in the federal funds rate also raises domestic 
interest rates and lowers growth and finally, better (higher) prices in commodities fuel 
growth.  
 
Our estimated macroeconomic model reflects the basic dynamic features of the 
Argentine business cycle. The federal funds rate proxies the degree of international 
liquidity and sets a floor to the cost for the government of borrowing from the 
international capital market. The sovereign risk measures the mood of local and 
international investors towards Argentina and is strongly correlated with the capital 
flows that expand and contract aggregate demand. Finally, the commodity price 
index indicates the direction of the income effect due to changes in the price of local 
exports. However, this model fails to take into account other effects that may be 
important to explain the business cycle. In particular, we are modeling first round 
effects only, i.e., the effect of external shocks on the macroeconomy and ultimately 
on the banking sectors credit losses. Marcucci and Quagliariello (2005) incorporate 
to their VAR the feedback effect that a stress situation in the banking sector has on 
the business cycle, amplifying the effect of the original shocks, via the bank capital 
channel. 
 
 
IV. Scenario Analysis 
 
In this section we stress test the losses for credit risk of the banking sector. To this 
purpose we use the toolkit developed in the previous section, together with different 
approaches to incorporating shocks in the risk factors that drive the business cycle. 
Our stress tests take place during 2007: they simulate the behavior of the bank loss 
rate as a result of an extreme but plausible adverse scenario taking place during that 
year.  
 
In a first attempt we perform deterministic stress tests. We implement historical 
scenarios, with risk factors behaving as in 1995 in the aftermath of the Mexican 
devaluation (Tequila crisis) and as in 2001, before the sharp depreciation and 
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sovereign default of 2002. We also simulate a judgmental or subjective scenario, 
assuming a deterioration of all risk factors with respect to their position as of 2006.  
 
In the second and third approaches the scenario analysis are stochastic and 
obtained by Monte Carlo simulation. In one case we implement a bootstrapping 
technique, while in the other we sample repeatedly from a multivariate normal 
distribution to obtain correlated realizations of the risk factors.  
 
Regardless of how the risk factors are assumed to behave or simulated, we then use 
the macroeconomic VAR to forecast GDP growth and AR$ interest rates, and our 
satellite model to estimate bank losses for credit risk during 2007. To assess the 
reliability of our results we will estimate the ratio of LLPs with two models: Blundell 
and Bonds (1998) System GMM estimator (BB) and Brunos (2004) LSDV corrected 
estimator with first step System GMM estimates (Bruno (BB)).   
 
Having estimated the ratio of LLPs to loans to the private sector with both dynamic 
panel data methodologies, we quantify the capital needed to cover the unexpected 
losses for credit risk. In the deterministic scenario they are computed as the 
difference between the estimated LLPs for 2007, in the stress scenario, and LLPs as 
of end 2006, both as a fraction of loans to the private sector. In the stochastic 
scenario analysis, unexpected losses at the 99.9th confidence level are computed as 
the 99.9th percentile of the simulated distribution, net of prevailing provisions.  
 
Both in the deterministic and stochastic tests, the banking sector as a whole needs to 
have enough capital to absorb the increase in the ratio of LLPs that would result from 
the stress event. Taking Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as of end 2006 and subtracting from 
it regulatory capital requirements for interest rate risk (market risk in the banking 
book), the remaining available capital covered up to 30.3% of the loans to the private 
sector.  
 
IV.a. Deterministic Scenarios 
 
Historical Scenario Analysis 
 
In this simple approach to stress tests we will first evaluate the macroeconomic 
model developed in section III.b. with the realizations of the risk factors observed 
after the Mexican devaluation and during the Argentine Currency Board collapse. In 
the second case we perform a two-year analysis: the crisis began in 2001 with a loss 
of confidence that resulted in massive capital outflows and a bank panic by the end 
of that year. In 2002, the sovereign default and abandonment of the Currency Board 
deepened the crisis. Table 5 shows, for each historical episode, the risk factors and 
the observed GDP growth, AR$ interest rates and the ratio of LLPs to loans to the 
private sector. 
 
For each scenario the results obtained from the macroeconomic model are 
introduced into the microeconomic or satellite model to forecast the losses for credit 
risk.  
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Table 5. Description of Historical Scenarios 
Risk Factors Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Sovereign Risk 
(b.p.) 
Commodities Price 
Index 
Fed Funds Rate 
(%) 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
AR$ Interest Rate 
(%) 
LLPs/L 
(%) 
 
Scenario I. Contagion from Tequila Crisis 
1995 1159.9 91.6 5.8 -2.8 41.6 10.6 
 
Scenario II. Currency Board Crisis 
2001 1544.3 70.4 3.9 -4.4 40.4 12.4 
2002 5726.3 74.4 1.7 -10.9 63.2 28.8 

 December 1995 = 100. 
 
For the same realizations of the risk factors observed during the abovementioned 
events, Table 6 includes the forecasted GDP growth and AR$ interest rates, 
obtained from the macroeconomic model.  
 
Table 6. Historical Scenario Analysis - Results 
Macroeconomic Forecasts Estimated LLPs  (%) 
Unexpected Loss 
 (%) 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
AR$ Interest Rate 
(%) Bruno (BB) BB Bruno (BB) BB 
Available 
Capital 
(%) 
Scenario I. Tequila Crisis 
1.2 27.6 28.2 21.1 23.4 16.3 30.3 
Scenario II. Currency Board Crisis 
-1.8 27.7 32.4 24.8 27.5 20 30.3 
                     Expressed as fraction of loans to the non-financial private sector. 
 
During 2006 the environment was particularly favorable from the point of view of 
sovereign risk (364 b.p.), the fed funds rate (5%) and the price of commodities 
(105.7). Therefore, scenarios I (Tequila) and II (Currency Board crisis) imply an 
increase in sovereign risk of 219% and 324% respectively, and a reduction in the 
price of commodities of 13.4% and 33.4%. The fed funds rate was 16% higher in 
1995 but 22% lower in 2001. Although we evaluate the models with the same risk 
factors as observed in the chosen events, the forecasted GDP and AR$ interest rates 
should be different from the ones observed on those occasions, since the 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing in 2006 are significantly different from those in 
1994 and 2000, before the shocks took place.  
 
The results in Table 6 show that banks have enough capital to absorb the credit risk 
losses that would arise should a shock similar to the one observed in 1995 happen 
again. While the Bruno (BB) and BB estimators yield unexpected losses of 23.4% 
and 16.3% of the loans to the private sector, banks hold capital for credit risk 
equivalent to 30.3% of these loans. A similar conclusion is drawn when analyzing the 
results for the second scenario, where the selected dynamic panel data 
methodologies forecast unexpected losses in the range of 27.5% and 20% that can 
be easily absorbed with available capital. 
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However, the event that motivates the second scenario lasted up to 2002, as shown 
in Table 5. Although the risk factors affected the country negatively in 2001, the 
economy slipped into a massive crisis in the first half of 2002, after the overshooting 
(almost 300% depreciation) of the exchange rate and debt default. If we reproduce 
the exercise with the risk factors observed in 2002 (sovereign risk at 5726.3 b.p., fed 
funds rate at 1.7% and the commodities index at 74.4), the panel data models yield a 
LLPs/L ratio that ranges between 62% and 50%. Although in this case available bank 
capital would not suffice to cover these higher losses, it is actually not expected to 
cover them either: bank losses in worst-case scenarios can not be completely 
absorbed by bank capital. The year 2002 saw a major and massive disruption in 
economic activity take place, particularly in the banking system. The AR Peso 
depreciated almost 300% in the first quarter, the public debt was defaulted and bank 
deposit convertibility was suspended. Since most bank loans and deposits were in 
US$ they were converted to AR$ at an exchange rate that partially liquefied them. In 
such a worst-case scenario taking place bank capital, high as it may be, can hardly 
cope with the unexpected losses that arise, which require public policies of a different 
kind to deal with them.  
 
Even though Table 6 leads to the conclusion that current bank capital is sufficient to 
absorb bank losses, the results are conservative, and therefore overestimate losses, 
for at least the following reasons. Firstly, the model does not incorporate any reaction 
function from bank managers or the central bank to lessen the intensity of the 
adverse scenario. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, given the observed 
behavior of the risk factors it seems highly unlikely that during the course of only one 
year they will deteriorate as assumed in the scenarios. Back in the Tequila and 
Currency Board crisis the sovereign risk averaged 600 and 670 b.p. before 
increasing to 1160 b.p. and 1544 b.p. respectively. In the case of the commodity 
price index, while its past behavior supports the possibility of a 13.4% reduction (to 
the Tequila crisis level), the possibility that it might fall 33.4% in the course of a year 
is remote. Therefore, these results can perhaps be evaluated as taking place during 
the course of two years, which would give bank managers more leeway to mitigate 
losses and to inject capital. 
 
Judgmental Scenario Analysis 
 
While the historical scenarios have the advantage that they represent situations that 
have happened in the past, they do on the other hand run the risk of being obsolete 
or inadequate given the current juncture. Therefore in what follows we define a 
scenario for 2007 subjectively, assuming: a 150% increase in sovereign risk to 900 
b.p., a 20% reduction in the commodity price index to 85 and a 20% increase in the 
fed funds rate to 6%. Table 7 shows the forecasted GDP and interest rates for 2007 
and the stressed losses. 
 
Table 7. Judgmental Scenario Analysis  Results 
Macroeconomic Forecasts Estimated LLPs  (%) 
Unexpected Loss 
 (%) 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
AR$ Interest Rate 
(%) Bruno (BB) BB Bruno (BB) BB 
Available 
Capital 
(%) 
0.5 27 29.2 22.1 24.3 17.1 30.3 
 Expressed as fraction of loans to the non-financial private sector. 
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The results, on this occasion stemming from a subjective scenario, indicate the 
resilience of the Argentine banking sector to extreme but plausible adverse shocks. 
The estimated unexpected losses that would have happened during 2007 had this 
scenario taken place range between 17.1% and 24.3% with the BB and Bruno (BB) 
estimators, and are below the capital available in the banking system to cover 
unexpected credit risk. 
 
IV.b. Stochastic Scenario Analysis 
 
Bootstrapping Approach 
 
In this sub-section we implement a non-parametric approach to obtaining a 
distribution for the ratio of LLPs to loans to the private sector, by performing Monte 
Carlo simulation from the risk factors bootstrapped joint distribution. First we 
estimate the joint distribution of the risk factors in the VAR by means of a multivariate 
or parallel bootstrapping. This is done by randomly resampling from the risk factors 
empirical joint distribution: we take their historical monthly time series between 1993 
and 2007 and draw 50,000 samples of 12 observations with replacement16. Each 
draw contains a realization for each risk factor, the three of them corresponding to 
the same month. By this means we attempt to preserve the multivariate properties of 
the risk factors, particularly their structure of correlations. Then each risk factors 12 
observations in each sample are averaged, where the three averages constitute a 
simulated annual realization from the risk factors bootstrapped joint distribution. The 
bootstrapped marginal density of the sovereign risk is shown in Graph 3.  
 
Graph 3. Sovereign Risk Bootstrapped Marginal Density 
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16
 The risk factors behavior during 2002 was not included in any of the stochastic stress tests, since 
the events in that year constitute a worst-case scenario. Data for the first semester of 2003 was not 
included either, due to lack of meaningful data for sovereign risk.  
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With the three bootstrapped marginals and the macro model we compute one-step 
ahead forecasts of the macroeconomic variables. By doing this with each 
observation of the distribution we simulate 50,000 forecasts of both GDP growth 
and domestic interest rates. Finally, the simulated GDP growth distribution is used to 
compute the distribution of banks ratio of LLPs by means of the dynamic panel data 
models. The results for the selected approaches are shown in Table 8, and the loss 
distribution obtained from the Bruno (BB) model is shown in Graph 4. 
 
Table 8. Stochastic Scenario Analysis  Bootstrapped Loss Distribution 
 Minimum Median Mean 99,9% Unexpected Loss 
Available 
Capital 
Bruno (BB) 16.4 24 24 29.4 24.5 30.3 
BB 11.4 17.5 17.5 22.1 17.3 30.3 
 
 All figures are expressed as percentage of loans to the non-financial private sector. 
 
Graph 4. Bootstrapped Loss Distribution 
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Having computed the Value-at-Risk corresponding to a 99.9% confidence level, we 
subtract the ratio of LLPs as of end 2006. The result is the potential downside credit 
risk that would result from an adverse scenario produced by the combination of the 
risk factors, with a 99.9% confidence level. The results in Table 8 show that the 
estimated unexpected losses range from 17.3% with the BB estimator to 24.5% with 
the Bruno (BB) estimator, which are similar to those obtained in the deterministic 
stress tests. It also shows that these unexpected losses can be covered with 
available capital, no matter what satellite model is chosen to estimate LLPs.  
 
The parallel bootstrapping has the advantage that does not impose any assumption 
on the shape of the multivariate distribution but, conversely, tries to reconstruct it 
from the historical distribution. However, it has at least two limitations that must be 
taken into consideration when analyzing the results (Jorion (2001)): for small sample 
sizes the bootstrapped distribution may be a poor approximation to the actual one 
and it relies heavily on the assumption that risk factors are not serially correlated. By 
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simulating annual risk factors from monthly data we attempt to tackle the first 
limitation of this approach, since the underlying sample from which we bootstrap 
contains 159 observations. However, by sampling at random from monthly data we 
may indeed be disrupting any possibly existing relevant time pattern in data. 
 
Multivariate Normal Approach 
 
As an alternative to the non-parametric analysis developed above, we estimate a 
credit loss distribution by performing Monte Carlo from a multivariate normal 
distribution. To that purpose we take 50,000 random draws from a standard 
multivariate normal distribution, which are then transformed into correlated shocks 
using a Cholesky decomposition of risk factors covariance matrix. Having then 
simulated 50,000 correlated realizations of the risk factors, we forecast 50,000 
realizations of GDP growth. These are used to obtain LLPs estimates with the Bruno 
(BB) and BB microeconomic models. The results are summarized in Table 9 and the 
loss distribution obtained with the Bruno (BB) estimator is shown in Graph 5. 
 
Table 9. Stochastic Scenario Analysis  Multivariate Normal Loss Distribution 
 Minimum Median Mean 99,9% Unexpected Losses 
Available 
Capital 
Bruno (BB) 8 23.7 24.2 45.4 40.6 30.3 
BB 5.2 17.3 17.8 37.1 32.3 30.3 
 
 All figures are expressed as percentage of loans to the non-financial private sector. 
 
According to this Monte Carlo experiment and with a 99.9% confidence level, banks 
unexpected losses would escalate to a range between 32.3% to 40.6% of the loans 
to the private sector. The 32.3% floor corresponds to the BB estimator, whose 
potential problems (particularly as a result of a negative estimated coefficient in the 
lagged interest rate) were discussed in section III.a. On the other hand, unexpected 
losses derived from the Bruno (BB) estimator would not be completely covered with 
bank capital. These estimated unexpected losses are not only very different to those 
obtained with the other deterministic and stochastic methodologies, but also are 
inconsistent with the observed ratio of LLPs, which in the estimation window never 
exceeded 29%. 
 
The reliability of these results is affected by our assumption regarding the 
multivariate normal nature of risk factors, which implies Gaussian marginal for the 
risk factors and that for the sovereign risk is unrealistic. Also, the simulated risk 
factors marginals display a range of variation inconsistent with the one observed in 
actual data, for example taking negative values. 
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Graph 5. Multivariate Normal Loss Distribution 
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V. Conclusions 
 
Stress tests for credit risk have evolved in the last years as an important element in 
bank risk management. Throughout this paper we attempted to construct a full 
fledged methodology for performing macro stress testing for credit risk. To this end 
we developed the different elements of the methodology. With panel data techniques 
we estimated a dynamic model for bank losses for credit risk. Although we compared 
the estimated coefficients with different statistical approaches, in almost all cases 
they had the expected sign. The macroeconomic variables that are covariates in the 
satellite model were modeled with a Vector Autoregression that forecasts GDP 
growth and interest rates with the sovereign risk, the price of commodities and the 
federal funds rate.  
 
To model credit risk losses in stress situations we followed different approaches: 
deterministic (historical and judgmental) and stochastic with Monte Carlo simulation 
(based on bootstrapping and in the multivariate normal distribution). The historical 
scenarios have the advantage that they reproduce events experienced by the 
Argentine economy, while the judgmental scenario is perhaps more informative of 
what would happen should the current juncture (as of end 2006) deteriorate. On the 
other hand, the judgmental scenario does not necessarily incorporate the 
covariances between risk factors and might therefore be excessively conservative. 
Stochastic scenarios have the advantage that they yield a loss distribution and allow 
calculation of loss rates with different confidence levels. However, the results rely 
heavily on the ability of the approach to replicate the multivariate nature of the risk 
factors.  
 
In general, the results from all the scenario analyses indicate that bank capital is 
sufficient to cover unexpected losses for credit risk in stress events. With the 
exception of the scenario analysis based on the multivariate normal simulation, all 
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the stress tests yield unexpected losses that range between 16% and 28% of loans 
to the private sector, below available bank capital.  
 
The conclusions in this paper about bank solvency in stress scenarios did not 
address the degree of capital adequacy at a bank level, since unexpected losses 
have been compared to the capital ratio of the banking sector as a whole. Other 
pending topics that may be addressed in future research include modeling risk 
factors dependence structure using other techniques, such as with copula functions 
or with a multivariate extreme value theory approach.  
 
Finally, it is of paramount importance that the results herein obtained regarding credit 
risk losses in stress scenarios are modeled jointly with other major risks to the 
financial system, such as interest rate risk or liquidity risk. This would enable 
assessment of the overall capacity of the banking sector to absorb unexpected 
losses of various risks arising in stress scenarios. 
 
 
References 
 
Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, 277-297.  
 
Anderson, T.W. and C. Hsiao (1982). Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models 
using Panel Data, Journal of Econometrics, 18, 47-82. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - 
Comprehensive Version, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Behr, A. (2003). A comparison of dynamic panel data estimators: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to the investment function. Discussion Paper 05/03, 
Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models, Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143. 
 
Bruno, G.S.F. (2004). Approximating the Bias of the LSDV Estimator for Dynamic 
Unbalanced Panel Data Models, Universita Bocconi, Instituto di Economia Politica. 
 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2001). A survey of stress tests and 
current practice at major financial institutions, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2005). Stress testing at major financial 
institutions: survey results and practice, Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Gutierrez Girault, M. (2007). Non  Parametric Estimation of Conditional and 
Unconditional Loan Portfolio Loss Distributions with Public Credit Registry Data, 
Technical Document, Central Bank of Argentina. 
 
 19
Hayakawa, H. (2005). Small Sample Bias Properties of the System GMM Estimator 
in Dynamic Panel Data Models, Discussion Paper Series N°82, Institute of Economic 
Research, Hitotsubashi University. 
 
Jorion, P. (2001). Value at Risk, McGraw-Hill.  
 
Judson, R.A. and A.L. Owen (1996). Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A 
Practical Guide for Macroeconomists. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
 
Kiviet, J.F. (1995). On bias, inconsistency and efficiency of various estimators in 
dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics, 68, 53-78. 
 
Marcucci, J. and M. Quagliariello (2005). Is Bank Portfolio Procyclical? Evidence 
from Italy using a Vector Autoregression. Discussion Paper in Economics 2005/09, 
The University of York. 
 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (2003). Technical Paper on Credit Stress-Testing, 
MAS Information Paper 01-2003. 
 
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica, Vol. 
49, No. 6. pp. 1417-1426. 
 
Superintendence of Exchange and Financial Institutions (2006), Survey of stress 
tests, Financial System Analysis Department, Market Risk Division. 
